Panpsychism or Evolutionary Materialism

@article{citeulike:890572, abstract = {I shall be concerned in this paper with the consideration of panpsychism and of materialism in new forms as alternatives. Extended reference will be made to C. S. Peirce's view of perception as realistic in intention and yet not quite clear as to its mechanism and how it attains objective import. I shall say little about Whitehead as a representative of panpsychism as I have just finished a detailed criticism of his epistemological framework. I shall, however, make comments on William James's radical empiricism as tied in with his view of perception as direct and immediate--roughly speaking, the alternative to Locke's representation of \"unperceived things\" --and bring in my own theory of sensations as guiding perceiving. Russell's neutral monism, connected historically with James's radical empiricism, will be touched on here in connection with his rejection of materialism. Phenomenalism and materialism exclude each other. Materialism, as an ontology, requires a realistic epistemology. I shall also make some comments on Dewey's biological experientialism. One can often best explain a perspective by means of contrasts.}, author = {Sellars, Roy W. }, citeulike-article-id = {890572}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, keywords = {emergent\_evolution, panpychism}, number = {4}, pages = {329--350}, posted-at = {2006-10-10 01:25:12}, priority = {4}, title = {Panpsychism or Evolutionary Materialism}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/185235}, volume = {27}, year = {1960} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:890572 L3 - citeulike-article-id:890572 N2 - I shall be concerned in this paper with the consideration of panpsychism and of materialism in new forms as alternatives. Extended reference will be made to C. S. Peirce's view of perception as realistic in intention and yet not quite clear as to its mechanism and how it attains objective import. I shall say little about Whitehead as a representative of panpsychism as I have just finished a detailed criticism of his epistemological framework. I shall, however, make comments on William James's radical empiricism as tied in with his view of perception as direct and immediate--roughly speaking, the alternative to Locke's representation of "unperceived things" --and bring in my own theory of sensations as guiding perceiving. Russell's neutral monism, connected historically with James's radical empiricism, will be touched on here in connection with his rejection of materialism. Phenomenalism and materialism exclude each other. Materialism, as an ontology, requires a realistic epistemology. I shall also make some comments on Dewey's biological experientialism. One can often best explain a perspective by means of contrasts. IS - 4 JF - Philosophy of Science EP - 350 TI - Panpsychism or Evolutionary Materialism VL - 27 SP - 329 KW - emergent_evolution KW - panpychism AU - Sellars, Roy PY - 1960/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/185235 ER -